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I. INTRODUCTION
The augmenting concern for the environment over the past twenty-five
years is reflected in the amplification of environmental laws and
international environmental agreements. This growth has occurred in the
context of an increasingly integrated world economy and a rapidly
expanding flow of international trade and investment. The potential for
conflict between environmental and trade policy objectives was vividly
realized in the debate over the North American Free Trade Agreement in
the early 1990s. 31 Although the NAFTA's provisions failed to appease
political views in the United States, they connote, however, a small piece
of a large environmental puzzle which was ultimately completed upon the
consummation of a separate side agreement on the environment, the North
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation.32 The NAAEC's
implementation reflects a heightened desire to enforce international
environmental cooperation and a rising concern that the NAFTA failed to
adequately protect against the adverse effects of increased trade on the
environment.
This article will follow a deductive approach in order to comprehend
the intricacies involved in the NAFTA and NAAEC's environmental
provisions. It will also contextualize the inseparable relationship between
environmental protection and trade which is depicted in these agreements.
Part I will review and analyze the NAFTA's environmental provisions,
focusing on their relevant mechanisms, nexus to trade, and shortcomings.
In Part II, the uniqueness and effectiveness of the formula developed to
reconcile trade and the environment in the form of the NAAEC will be
introduced. Part III is divided into three categories: the Commission for
Environmental Cooperation ("CEC"), 33 Dispute Resolution Mechanisms,
and the Submission Process under the NAAEC. Here, each subsection's
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31 North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 289
(1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
32 North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 13, 1993, Can.-
Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M. 1480 [hereinafter NAAEC].
33 See NAAEC, supra note 2, at 1485.
viability in ensuring that member nations dutifully enforce their
environmental laws is examined, as well as each component's efficiency in
monitoring the efforts made by the Parties to reach the NAAEC's goals.
Part III will consider the mandate and operations of the NAAEC and its
relevant elements, the Parties and the CEC, while defining the flaws and
virtues of the NAAEC. Finally, Part IV will suggest revisions to particular
sections of the NAFTA and NAAEC in light of the North American
experience regarding environmental protection and trade since 1994.
PART I: THE NAFTA
When the NAFTA took effect on January 1, 1994, it created the largest
free trade zone in the world.34 The United States, Canada, and Mexico
entered into this agreement in order to remove restrictions on imports and
exports among the three Parties and to increase the opportunity for
investment in each member nation.35 By removing these trade barriers, the
countries anticipated economic growth through a rise in the availability of
consumer goods and stronger positions for each nation in the global
market.
36
Although the NAFTA is primarily a trade agreement, it contains
environmental provisions that exceed the boundaries of previous trade
agreements. This article, in part, focuses on these environmental
provisions and their association with trade. While the NAFTA's purpose is
to promote free trade between the Parties, its preamble lists environmental
protection and conservation, sustainable development, and the
enforcement of environmental laws and regulations as factors meriting
support within a trade agreement.
37
In Article 104 (Relation to Environmental and Conservation
Agreements), the NAFTA acknowledges various environmental
commitments, as well as the relationship between trade and the
environment. 38 Simultaneously, however, it provides wide boundaries for
exceptions and a permissive understanding of its environmental
provisions.39 The NAFTA's primary and most detrimental flaw is that it
34 See NAFTA, supra note 1.
35 See id. at 287; LESLIE ANN GLICK, UNDERSTANDING THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE
TRADE AGREEMENT 3 (2d ed. 1994).
36 See NAFTA, supra note 1, at 297.37 See id. at 297 (outlining the six trade related objectives in the NAFTA). The NAAEC
refers to member nations as "Parties."
38 See NAFTA, supra note 1, at 298. In an attempt to protect the integrity of the trade-
restrictive enforcement provisions in multilaterally negotiated environmental treaties, the
NAFTA's Article 104 exempts from challenge certain multilateral agreements including
the Convention on the International Trade of Endangered Species and the Montreal
Protocol. Id.
39 See id., art 104, at 298 (providing that in the event of an inconsistency between the
NAFTA and certain trade obligations provided in certain international environmental
fails to set any environmental standards or a particular level of
environmental quality. 40 Instead, the Agreement balks at standard
conversion and conformation and embraces each Party's unparalleled set
of domestic environmental regulations.
4 1
The majority of the NAFTA's environmental provisions are included
in Chapter 7 on Agriculture and Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
("SPS") 42 and in Chapter 9 on Standard Related Measures ("SRM"). In
these chapters, the NAFTA establishes "zones" that are impervious to
forbidden trade barriers and nontariff trade barriers ("NTBs"). Although
they are usually ambivalent, NTBs are national standards that were
constructed to obscure trade.43 The NAFTA specifically condones NTBs
in Chapter 9, permitting Parties to embrace any SRM but particularly
those that would help define the Parties' levels of environmental
protection.
44
Moreover, any SPS "necessary for the protection of human, animal or
plant life or health in its territory, including a measure more stringent than
an international standard, guideline or recommendation" may be embraced
by a Party under Article 712.45 According to the NAFTA, SPS measures
should be "applied only to the extent necessary to achieve [the Party's]
appropriate level of protection taking into account technical and economic
feasibility. '46 Yet, the NAFTA also provides that "[n]o Party may adopt,
maintain or apply any sanitary or phytosanitary measure with a view to, or
with the effect of, creating a disguised restriction on trade between the
Parties. ,47 Such discrepancies generate uncertainty and havoc amongst the
Parties, causing "major conflicts [of environmental provisions which] will
likely be tracked out to dispute resolution for fact-specific findings.
'
"
48
The NAFTA also contains many additional environmental provisions,
namely Articles 1114(1) and 1114(2) of Chapter 11 and Article 1709 of
Chapter 17.49 Article 1114(1) permits Parties to adopt standards they
agreements, the latter should prevail.) See also Robert K. Paterson et al., International
Trade and Investment Law in Canada 3.1 l(a)(iii) (2d. ed. 1994).
40 See NAFTA, supra note 1, at 297.
41 See Jeffrey Atik, Environmental Standards Within NAFTA: Difference by Design and
the Retreatfrom Harmonization, 3 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 81, 82 (1995).
42 Sanitary and phytosanitary measures, measures generally intended to protect against
health risks from the "introduction, establishment or spread of a pest or disease," are
more stringent than international standards and may be adopted if they have some
specific basis and are fairly applied. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 712.
43 See Atik, supra note 11, at 90, 99.44 See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 904, at 387.451 d. art. 712, at 377.
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48 Atik, supra note 11, at 96.
49 See Patterson, supra note 9, at 3.11 (a)(iii).
believe will foster actions perceptive to environmental concerns. On the
other hand, Article 1114(2) encourages Parties to remain steadfast in
upholding their environmental regulations designed to attract or retain
investment. Further, Article 1709 permits Parties to thwart inventions
from patentability if the invention proves to be permissible as an effort to
protect human, animal or plant life or health, or to avoid harm to nature or
the environment.
A. A Critical Assessment of the NAFTA, the Environment, and Public
Safety
As the NAFTA was being negotiated, environmentalists were
becoming increasingly vocal and were heightening public awareness as a
result. Thus, environmentalists did not embrace the NAFTA upon its
conclusion in December 1992. Their disapproval of the NAFTA was
justified, as close scrutiny of the NAFTA's environmental provisions and
their definitions bring specific environmental concerns.
The first issue is the unenforceability of the NAFTA's preamble which
sets the tone for the Agreement. 50 Out of 15 preambular statements, three
concern the implementation of environmental laws or sustainable
development. 51 Unfortunately, however, not only are these regulations
ambiguous and unenforceable 52 but the NAFTA also failed to list
environmental protection as one of its primary goals.
53
Other issues regarding the NAFTA range from increased trade to
greater degradation of the environment. Evidence gathered over four years
has shown that the unregulated expansion of North American trade has
made an already heavily-polluted border region much dirtier and more
corrupt. Moreover, the NAFTA's counterparts, designed to handle such
environmental and public safety problems, are wholly inefficient. 
54
50 See Michelle Swenarchuk, The Environmental Implications of NAFTA: A Legal
Analysis, in GROWTH, TRADE AND ENVIRONMENTAL VALUES 83, 83-84 (Ted Schrecker
& Jean Dalgleish eds., 1994).
51 See JAMES R. HOLBEIN AND DONALD J. MUSCH, NAFTA FINAL TEXT: SUMMARY,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY & IMPLEMENTATION DIRECTORY 107 (1994). In the NAFTA's
preamble, the Parties plan to "undertake [trade and investment] . . . in a manner
consistent with environmental protection and conservation," "promote sustainable
development," and, "strengthen the development and enforcement of international laws
and regulations." Supra note 1, at 109. See also NAFTA, supra note 1, at 297.
52 See Pierie Marc Johnson & Andre Beaulieu, The Environment and NAFTA:
Understanding and Implementing the New Continental Law 1 (1996). C.f Vienna
Convention of the Law of Treatises, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. The United
States is not a party to the Vienna Convention. Id.53 See HOLBEIN & MUSCH, supra note 21, at 109.
54 For example, the NAFTA clean up plan for the U.S.-Mexico border has failed,
generating only 1% of the promised clean-up money; the NAFTA opened the U.S.
borders to trucks that fail to meet U.S. safety standards; the NAFTA has weakened food
safety inspections; the Ethyl Corporation of Virginia has filed a $120 million suit against
the Canadian government, under the NAFTA rules, after Canada banned a toxic gasoline
Among the most important issues associated with the NAFTA's
environmental provisions and trade agreements are that increased
competition is encouraging countries to either relax their environmental
regulations in order to preserve provincial commodities or to relocate to
areas of lower environmental standards in order to attract investment,
thereby creating "pollution havens." 55 The increase in industrial activity is
creating a rise in pollution and consumption of natural resources. This is
forcing an awesome burden onto the environment which is already
enduring extreme stress in many areas. Further, even though the NAFTA
is encouraging trade expansion, domestic and international environmental
laws are nonetheless creating unnecessary trade barriers which
consequently are threatening the veracity of multilateral agreements. 56 As
a result, member nations are able to compete domestically in the open
market by lowering the standards of their environmental regulations.
Furthermore, the exclusion of certain principles from the NAFTA has
caused great concern. These exclusions include statutes and regulations
focused on managing natural resources, through the regulation of various
harvesting methods, 57 and Canadian exceptions pertaining to the export of
raw logs and unprocessed fish.58 The health and safety of employees in
their working environments has also been neglected.59
PART II: THE NAAEC
The Parties to the NAFTA authored a side agreement, the NAAEC, in
an attempt to acquiesce the NAFTA's adverse effects and bolster the
environmental aspects and inseparable relationship of environmental
protection and trade.60 As its name suggests, the NAAEC is an accord
additive; the NAFTA weakened border inspections of U.S. trade. See Kal Raustuala, The
Policial Implications of the Enforcement of Provisions of the NAFTA Environmental Side
Agreement: The CEC as a Model for Future Accords, 25 ENVTL. L. 31, 34-35 (1995)
(failing to offer incentives to Mexico to enforce its domestic environmental regulations).
55 Under the NAFTA, "it is inappropriate [for Parties] to encourage investment by
relaxing health, safety or environmental measures." NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1114(2).
56 Examples of "multilateral agreements" are the Montreal Protocol or the Convention on
the International Trade in Endangered Species ("CITES").57 See Raustiala, supra note 24, at 43.58 See Swenarchuk, supra note 20, at 86.
59 See Paulette Stenzel, Can NAFTA's Environmental Provisions Promote Sustainable
Development?, 59 ALB. L. REv. 423, 472 (1995).
60 See John J. Kim & James P. Cargas, The Environmental Side Agreement to the North
American Free Trade Agreement: Background and Analysis, 23 ENVTL. L. REP. 10720,
10725-26 (1993). See Foreign Policy implications of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) and Legislative Requirements for the Side Agreements, Hearings
Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 103'd Cong. 14, at 18, 50 (1993)
(testimonies of Cameron Duncan, Trade Policy Coordinator for Greenpeace
International, and Rufus H. Yerxa, United States Trade Representative ("U.S.T.R.")
Deputy). See also North American Freetrade Agreement Supplemental Agreements and
Additional Documents, H.R. Doc. No. 160, at 170 (1993).
which propagates environmental protection among the governments of
Canada, Mexico, and the United States. It was designed to act as an
enforcement body that monitored the member nation's application of their
environmental laws. Further, it was devised to respond to primary
environmental concerns that emerged during the NAFTA negotiation in
1992 and 1993.61 Thus, this side Agreement to the NAFTA was created in
an attempt to correct the shortcomings of the main treaty. For this reason
alone, it must be regarded as part of the NAFTA package. The NAAEC,
however, also differs from the NAFTA, especially in its fundamental
approach which reflects a heightened desire to enforce international
environmental protection.
Divided into seven major "Parts" consisting of 51 "Articles," the
NAAEC possesses two presiding features. Parts I - IV and VI regard
issues to be covered through environmental cooperation of the CEC.62 Part
V sets forth dispute resolution procedures, accessible when one Party
alleges that another has disregarded the enforcement of its environmental
regulations. 63 The submission procedure which is available to individuals
and mandates the Secretariat, is established in Part III, Section B. Not
possessing autonomy within the NAAEC and not being incorporated
within the dispute resolution component, the Secretariat is relegated by the
NAAEC to a "secondary" status.Part I of the NAAEC sets forth the goals
of the Parties entering into the Agreement. 64 Under Article 1, such
objectives include: harboring the "protection and improvement of the
environment",65 11promot[ing] sustainable development,"66 "increas[ing]
cooperation between the Parties to enhance conservation and protection of
the environment,"67 avoiding the creation of trade distortions and new
trade barriers, 68  strengthening cooperation on improvement of
environmental laws and policies, 69 "enhanc[ing] compliance with . .
environmental laws,"70  "promot[ing] transparency and public
61 Environmental issues articulated by government and nongovernmental organizations
("NGOs") while forming the NAFTA illustrates that many concerns were associated to
the proliferating assimilation of the North American economy.
62 See NAAEC, supra note 2, at 1485.
63 See id. pt.V, at 1490.64 See id. at 1483.651 d. art.1(a).
6 6 !d. art. 1 (b).67 Id. art. 1 (c).
61 See id. art. 1(e).
69 See id. art. l(f). See generally Stephen Zamora, NAFTA and the Harmonization of
Domestic Legal Systems: The Side Effects of Free Trade, 12 Ariz. J. Int'l & Comp. L.
401, 402 (1995) (claiming the NAFTA made little effort in intermingling the Parties'
domestic laws); Raustiala, supra note 24, at 52 (suggesting the possibility of the U.S.
Congress deferring some environmental policy decisions to the NAFTA commissions).70 NAAEC, supra note 2, art.I(g), at 1483.
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participation" in environmental legislation, 7 1 and "support[ing] the
environmental goals and objectives of the NAFTA. 72
Part II, Articles 2-6, binds the Parties to their environmental
obligationsY3and mandates them, under Article 2, to occasionally make
reports, accessible to the public for review, that analyze the environment's
present state in their respective countries.74 The member nations must
confirm that their laws "provide for high levels of environmental
protection" pursuant to Article 3.75 In order to enable the public to
participate in the submission process, Article 4 demands accessibility to a
Party's enacted, but also proposed, environmental laws and policies.
76
Article 5 depicts the most "publicized" obligation: "each Party shall
effectively enforce its environmental laws and regulations through
appropriate governmental action. . . ."77 Here, "government action"
connotes various enforcement proceedings designed to rectify or
reprimand a nation's violation of its environmental laws and regulations.
78
Finally, Article 6 requires the Parties to provide private party access to
certain remedies, request the competent authorities to exercise
enforcement, and seek injunctions in the event of loss, damage or injury
resulting from the violation of environmental laws.
79
A. Commission for Environmental Cooperation
71 1d. art. 1(h). See Daniel Magraw, NAFTA and the Environment: Substance and Process
163, 11 (1995). See also Mark J. Spaulding, Transparency of Environmental Regulation
and Public Participation in the Resolution of International Environmental Disputes, 35
SANTA CLARAL. REv. 1127, 1136-38 (1995).
72 NAAEC, supra note 2, art.1(d), at 1483; cf NAFTA, supra note 1, at 297.
73 See NAAEC, supra note 2, art. 2(e). The most critical issue is to "assess, as
appropriate, environmental impacts." Ironically, the U.S. government failed to discharge
an environmental impact statement on the NAFTA. Id. art. 2.1 (e).
74 See id. art. 2(1)(a). Additionally, each Party must "develop and review environmental
emergency preparedness measures." Id. art. 2(1)(b).75 Id. art. 3. Unfortunately, the NAAEC does not define "high levels."
76 See id. art. 4.
77 Id. art. 5(1). See Daniel Magraw, NAFTA's Repercussions. Is Green Trade Possible?
36 Envt'l 14, 28 (1994) (requiring countries to enforce their environmental laws); see
also NAAEC, supra note 2, at 1485; cf Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, U.N.
Conference on the Law of Treaties Off. Rec., I" & 2d Sess., art. 26, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.
39/27 (1969).
78 See NAAEC, supra note 2, art. 5(2), at 1485. Even if a country possesses inadequate
law enforcement procedures, the NAAEC is in dire need of a provision that would further
action beyond consultation. Id. art. 5.3(b). It is uncertain whether "environmental laws"
here refers to all environmental laws or just the narrow range of laws specified in the
NAAEC. Id. art. 45(2).
79 See id. art. 6. Although the NAAEC has a provision addressing "Private Access to
Remedies," there are almost no substantive obligations in it. But see NAFTA and
Supplemental Agreements to NAFTA: Hearings before the Committee on Ways and
Means, 103'd Cong., 1st Sess. 48 (1993), at 43 (quoting EPA Administrator Carol
Browner: "there will be greater public access to courts and other bodies that enforce
environmental laws in all three countries because of the side agreement").
Part III of the NAAEC establishes the Commission for Environmental
Cooperation, or CEC,80 "to monitor the efforts of each of the [P]arties
toward[s NAAEC's] goal and to ensure that each sovereign dutifully
enforces its environmental laws."' 1 The CEC, however, was allotted no
enforcement power since its main function is to investigate the facts and
to foster adherence through its administrative and institutional bodies.
Article 8 establishes these bodies, which are comprised of a Council, a
Secretariat, and a Joint Advisory Committee.
82
Articles 9 and 10 of Section A create the Council of the Ministers of
the Environment ("the Council") of each Party. The Council, which
assembles annually and upon a Party's special request, represents the
member nations' political interests. 83 Furthermore, it is the foundation of
the CEC and the "forum for the discussion of environmental matters
within the scope" of the NAAEC's provisions.84 Its obligations include
monitoring the application of the NAAEC and providing suggestions to
better the NAAEC's operation and effectiveness.85 According to Article
10, as the CEC's governing body, the Council must oversee the
Secretariat, address questions and differences the Parties may encounter in
applying or interpreting the terms of the NAAEC, 86 and promote and
facilitate the Parties' cooperation on environmental matters.
87
Article 11 in Section B establishes the Secretariat who is governed by
an Executive Director elected by the Council.88 The Secretariat's duties
include preparing the CEC's annual budget and furnishing various support
to Council. 89 Expressing loyalty to the Council is of such paramount
importance that the Executive Director is enjoined from obtaining
information from any source other than from the Council. Further, in order
to preserve the Council's aura of an international community, the Parties
are forbidden from influencing others in this realm.90 In addition, the
80 See NAAEC, supra note 2, art. 8(1), at 1485. See also MARY E. KELLY, NAFTA'S
ENVIRONMENTAL SIDE AGREEMENT: A REVIEW AND ANALYSIS, TEXAS CENTER FOR
POLICY STUDIES (1993) (critiquing the CEC).
81 Adam Simon, North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, 8 GEO.
INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 496, 496 (1996).
82 See id. art.8(2).
83 See id. arts. 9(1), (3)(a)-(b).
841d. art. 10(1)(a).
85 See id. art. 10(1)(b). The NAAEC requires the Council's review "in the light of
experience" within "four years after the date of [its] entry into force." Id. The four-year
anniversary of the date of entry into force is January 1, 1998. See 19 U.S.C. § 3311
(1994).
86 See NAAEC, supra note 2, art. 10(1)(d), at 1486.
87See id. art. 10(1)(f).
88 See id. art. 1(1). The Executive Director is appointed for a three-year term that may
be renewed for one additional three-year term, or which may be ended early solely for
cause. See id. The Executive Director position is to be filled consecutively by each
nation on a rotating basis. See id.
89See id. art. 11(5)-(6).
90 See id. art. 11(4).
Council demands that the Secretariat presents to it each year an annual
report and a proposed budget for the upcoming year. 91 The Annual Report
concerns several aspects: a listing of the CEC's activities and expenses
during the previous year,92 information on how a member country is
propagating environmental protection, a Party's actions made on the
behalf of the NAAEC,93 and any significant data provided by NGOs or
persons94 such as various complaints or recommendations concerning the
environment. 95 In light of the screening role the Secretariat performs in
the citizen and NGO submission process, such an approach is of profound
importance with regard to reconciling governments and NGOs, as well as
trade interests and environmental concerns.
Articles 16, 17, and 18 of Section B, the final section of the CEC,
96create the Joint Public Advisory Committee ("JPAC"). A main venue for
the NGOs, the JPAC is a permanent body to the Council, consisting of
fifteen members which the Parties assume an equal role in electing.97 The
JPAC, however, selects its own chair.98 This committee, which meets
annually unless the Council mandates otherwise, is permitted to advise the
Council on any issue encompassed by the NAAEC." 99 The NAFTA and
NAAEC's presence are dire to the CEC's existence, because it provides
autonomy and authority that extends beyond the boundaries of the
NAFTA.100 As a result, the public duty of the NAFTA and NAAEC is
enhanced; moreover, it transforms the public into a monitor that regulates
the proliferating effect of trade on the environment.
Part IV mandates the three countries work together as a unit by
exchanging information, providing each other with valuable knowledge on
the environment, and replying to other Party's concerns.1 °1 It is important
to note, however, that the Parties are not obligated to exchange
information, such as that needed for the preparation of a Commission
report or factual record, when the laws of their countries enjoin it.102Furthermore, the countries are permitted to deny such disclosure to other
91See id. art. 12(2)(a)-(b).92 See id. art. 12(2)(a).
93 See id. art. 12(2)(c).
94 See generally supra note 37.
95 See NAAEC, supra note 2, art. 12(2)(d)-(f). The Secretariat may submit reports to the
Council on any matter falling within the scope of the annual program. See id. art. 13(1).96 See id. art. 16.
97 See id. art. 16(1). However, the Council can change that number. See id. Each Party
appoints an equal number of members, currently five. See id.
98See id. art. 16(2).
99 See id. art. 16(4). The JPAC may also provide "relevant technical, scientific or other
information" to the Secretariat for consideration in developing a factual record under
Article 15 for presentation to the Council. Id. art. 16(5).
100 See Johnson, supra note 22, at 139-40.101 See NAAEC, supra note 2, arts. 20-21, at 1489-90.
102 See id. art. 39(1).
countries if responding to their requests would be "excessive and
burdensome."'103 Finally, the Parties' enforcement agencies are not subject
to investigations by their respective Secretariats under the NAAEC.' °4
Part VI of the NAAEC provides guiding definitions, 10 5 technical
matters, and general provisions such as the NAAEC's relation to other
environmental agreements 10 6 and the national security exception.
10 7
Part VII sets forth the final provisions of the international trade
agreement which includes two additional annexes for Canada. The first
annex concerns trade sanctions and applicable replacement procedures.
10 8
It is made clear in the second annex that issues encompassed in Canada's
jurisdiction do not include the duties of the NAAEC.' °9 What is provided
for, however, are federal jurisdiction matters and certain provincial
concerns. Provincial participation is crucial since provinces representing
55% of Canada's gross domestic product must commit to the NAAEC
before its dispute resolution provisions apply to signatory governments.
110
B. Dispute Resolution Mechanisms
Dispute resolution is governed by the NAFTA and NAAEC's
environmental provisions and is limited to "Country-to-Country"
claims."' The NAAEC is not an agreement regarding the environment per
se, but rather a dispute resolution relating to the Parties' enforcement of
the their environmental standards to the NAFTA trade agreement.
112
How to administer dispute resolution under the NAFTA is specified in
Chapter 20.1 13 Articles under the NAFTA provide Parties with many
options when addressing dispute resolution. The member nations are able
to elect between a NAFTA mechanism or a General Agreements of Tariffs
103 See id. art. 21(2).104 See id. art. 11.
105 See id. art. 45.
106 See id. art. 40.
107 See id. art. 42. Although Part V has not yet been invoked by any of the Parties, in
order to make use of it, alleged non-enforcement must be part of a persistent pattern.
108 See NAAEC, supra note 2, annex 36A, at 1493.
109See id. art. 41, annex 41, at 1494.110 See id. annex 41.4, 41.5. See Ottawa, Quebec sign environmental side accord to
NAFTA, Eco-Log Week, Jan. 10, 1997, at 1, available in 1997 WL 9031149 (stating that
three provinces, thus far, have opted in: Alberta, Manitoba, and Quebec).
111 See Elizabeth A. Ellis, Note, Bordering on Disaster: A New Attempt to Control the
Trans-boundary Effects of Maquiladora Pollution, 30 VAL. U. L. REv. 621, 621-22
(1996). As of Fall 1998, no "Country-to-Country" disputes have been filed with the CEC.
Id.
112 See generally Beatriz Bugeda, Is NAFTA up to its green expectations? Effective law
enforcement under the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, 34 U.
RICH. L. REv. at 6 (forthcoming Jan. 1998) (stating, "[t]he most extensive section of the
environmental side agreement is the one dealing with settlement of disputes"). Id.
113 See NAFTA, supra note 1, at 296.
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and Trade ("GATT") dispute resolution under Article 2005. Suggestions
as to which dispute resolution process should be applied are made under
Articles 2014 and 2015 if you are a private party, including an NGO. Such
leeway by the NAFTA in regards to dispute resolution suggests the
Agreement is cognizant of environmental goals that warrant a divergence
from trade obligations. 11
4
Part V of the NAAEC also concerns dispute resolution. 115 In fact, it
authorizes the Council to assemble a committee if one member nation
claims that another is not effectively enforcing its environmental laws. 116
Such allegations may only pertain to a Party's non-enforcement of
environmental laws that involve goods traded in the North America or
produced by export-competing industries. The NAAEC, however, fails to
provide an environmental injury test. Thus, the complaining nation is not
required to establish environmental injury to it or to the alleged
permissively-regulated country.
117
C. The Submission Process Under the NAAEC
The submission process is the most effective instrument when
challenging the NAAEC on its environmental commitment. Part III,
Section B of the NAAEC lays out the submission procedure in stages. The
stages can either lead to ensuing steps or be aborted and end at any
interval. Articles 14 and 15, and to a lesser extent Article 13, are most
critical to the submission process. 118 Article 6, on the other hand, only
permits private party access to some remedies under the domestic law.
Although Articles 14 and 15 also allow private party access, they go one
step further than Article 6 by "opening the door" to the CEC.
Article 14 of the NAAEC provides the Secretariat with the power to
review and evaluate an NGO or individual's submission alleging that a
member nation is failing to adequately protect the environment against
adverse effects such as increased trade.' 9 As soon as the Secretariat is
provided with such a claim, it immediately determines whether the bid is
grounded, in other words, whether it meets the CEC's guidelines. 120 If the
114 See, e.g., Ileana Porras, The Puzzling Relationship Between Trade and Environment:
NAFTA, Competitiveness, and the Pursuit of Environmental Welfare Objectives, 3 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 65, 69 n.8 (1995).
115 See NAAEC, supra note 2, at 1490.116 See id. at 1490.
117 See NAAEC, supra note 2, art. 24.1.
118 See NAAEC, supra note 2, arts. 13-15.
119 See id. art. 14(1). Although several Article 14 petitions have already been filed with
the NAAEC, the NAAEC ruled for the first time, in Spring 1997, that the U.S. must
respond to all submissions by NGOs alleging ineffective enforcement of the
environmental laws by the U.S.
120 See id. As of Fall 1998, fifteen (15) of such Article 14 petitions have been filed; seven
(7) have been disposed of, and eight (8) are still pending. Only one submission has been
subject to investigation; the environmental impact of the construction of a pier on the
Secretariat concludes that the submission requires a further investigation,
it then formally requests a response from the Party against whom the
complaint was made.
12 1
Continuing in the submission process under Article 15 of the NAAEC,
the CEC may then request a fact-finding hearing that may otherwise be
known as a factual record. This factual record would be the final stage and
could be accessible to the public upon a two-thirds vote by the CEC.
Of less significance to the submission process is Article 13. Under this
article, the Secretariat must "prepare a report for the Council on any
matter within the scope of the annual program . . . [as well as] on any
other environmental matter related to the cooperative functions of this
Agreement."' 122 The report may include any relevant technical or scientific
information that is publicly available or that interested parties submit.
123
However, "[s]uch other environmental matters should not include issues
related to whether a [P]arty has failed to enforce its environmental laws
and regulations." 124 Instead, Article 14 encompasses the "issues" to which
Article 13 has made reference. It is important to note that even though
Article 13 does not specifically exclude a submission process, it fails to
confer one as well. Thus, a submitting party would have another resort
under Article 13 were his/her submission repudiated under Article 14.
PART III
A. Flawed Areas of the NAAEC and its Relevant Components
Although some environmentalists were dissatisfied with the NAAEC,
others felt it did achieve all of its goals. 125 In light of the North American
Carribean resort island of Cozumel. 1998 Rep. of the Indep. Rev. Comm. at 19. See
Christopher N. Bolinger, Assessing the CEC on its record to date, 28 LAW AND POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 1107, 1122 (1997).
121 See NAAEC, supra note 2, art. 14(2). See also Commission for Environmental
Cooperation, Registry of Submissions on Enforcement Matters: Sierra Club et al.,
(visited April 7, 1999) http://www.cec.org/templates/registryview.cfi?&varlan =
English&submissionlD=2&format-I (finding that a submission by the Sierra Club
against the United States did not meet Article 14(1)(a)-(f)'s criteria and stating that the
Secretariat would not request a response from the United States); cf Commission for
Environmental Cooperation, Registry of Submissions on Enforcement Matters: The
Southwest Center for Biological Diversity et al., (visited April 7, 1999)
http://www.cec.org/templates/registryview.cfi?&varlan=English&submissionlD=8&for
mat=2 (informing the Southwest Center for Biological Diversity and Dr. Robin Silver
that a response was requested from the United States under Article 14(2) of the NAAEC).
122 NAAEC, supra note 2, art. 13(1).
121 See id. art. 13(2)(a)-(f). The information may be submitted by NGOs or persons, by a
governmental Party, through conferences or seminars, and by experts consulted by the
Secretariat. Id.124 Id. art. 13.
125 "The belief that [the NAAEC and] NAFTA's environmental institutions have failed to
carry out their mandate was partly responsible for President Bill Clinton's failure to win
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experience on environmental protection and trade since 1994, the
discontented individuals' reasons are justified; the NAAEC possesses
several flaws.
A primary drawback of the NAAEC involves the submission process.
Although time limits are prescribed to the submitting party and the
responding party, a time limit fails to be enforced on the Secretariat at any
stage of the submission process. This forces the credibility of the CEC to
be undermined. 126 Moreover, at stage two, the submitting party's
participation in the process terminates upon the Secretariat's decision on
whether or not to request a Party's response. 127 From this stage forward,
the submitting party's participation in the submission process is non-
existent. 128 At this point, the Secretariat assumes the submitting party's
role and acts as its delegator. Meanwhile, the Party remains actively
involved in the submission process. The permissibility of the Party's
actions is so broad, in fact, that it may even review and comment on the
submitting party's draft.
Moreover, the submission process lacks allowance for any private
direct action. 129 In fact, the process applies pressure through public
opinion instead of through actual enforcement. 13 In order to compel a
Party to adhere to its environmental regulations, more stringent measures
need to be asserted. Many consider the lack of and need for concrete relief
that is both recognized and upheld by all Parties to be a drastic vice of the
submission process. 131
The NAAEC's Commission is undoubtedly restricted in its range of
autonomy and control. 132 It is merely regarded as an instrument with
"fast-track" authority [in 1997] .... 1998 WL 5987973. This authority "would have
enabled him to negotiate new trade agreements that Congress would have [had] to either
accept, or reject [as] the final submitted... package." Id.
126 See Jay Tutchton, The Citizen Petition Process Under NAFTA's Environmental Side
Agreement: It's Easy to Use, But Does it Work? 26 ENVTL. L. REP. 10021, 10034 n.13
(1996) (quoting "justice delayed is justice denied").
127 If the Secretariat does decide to prepare a factual record at this stage in the submission
process, the submitter may only provide the Secretariat with information for generating
the report. See Bugeda, supra note 82, at 18.
128 See Tutchton, supra note 96, at 10034.
129 See Stenzel, supra note 29, at 472; Jack Garvey, Trade Law and Quality of Life - -
Dispute Resolution under the NAFTA Side Accords on Labor and the Environment, 89
Am. J. Int'l. L. 439, 445 (1995).
130 The only benefit of a factual record is its effect on public opinion and the indirect
pressure it places on member nations to abide by their environmental laws and to initiate
new legislation. See Bugeda, supra note 82, at 17.
131 See Bugeda, supra note 82, at 16 (stating "the fact that the process provides not for a
judicial decision, but for an informative clarification in the form of a factual report
resulting in the absence of direct guarantee of remedy, is [ ] a serious shortcoming of the
procedure"). But see Tutchton, supra note 96, at 10034.
132 See Spaulding, supra note 41, at 1133.
which NGOs may gain political attention by expressing their
apprehensions. The Executive Director's lack of control comprises the
weak foundation of the CEC. Another facet of the CEC's flaws is its
ability to bar the public's access to complaints or reports. This contradicts
the NAAEC's alleged attempts to encourage public participation and
access, since it consciously and unlawfully obstructs the public's right to
know.' 3 3 Further, Parties are furnished with such immense power under
the CEC that they are potentially able, initially, to block unfavorable
submissions. 1
34
Flaws exist not only in the NAAEC's submission process, but also in
the environmental issues it covers. In particular, the NAFTA's definition
of "environment" remains too narrow. "The health and safety of workers
within the walls of the worksite [shall] be protected, as well as the health
and safety of citizens outside its walls."'135 Since the NAAEC purposely
deterred any new environmental legislation, this rebuff would be more
appropriate if leveled at the NAFTA.
B. Virtues of the NAAEC and the Submission Process
Notwithstanding the foregoing negative comments, the attributes of
the NAAEC and the submission process merit some recognition. In
particular, the very downfalls emphasized above also stress the side
Agreement's benefits. 136 Ironically, critical to the prosperity of trade
agreements, such as the NAAEC, is the Parties' ability to block the
public's access to reports or complaints.
The NAAEC was a triumph for environmental advocates since it
reached heights unprecedented in previous trade agreements. 137 One of its
greatest achievements was the opportunity for public interaction, which
was made possible through the CEC.138 Only time will tell if such
participation will project a more favorable outlook upon the NAAEC's
Commission. 139 Even though the NAAEC obviously requires some
restructuring, its shortcomings should be overridden by its major
accomplishment: gaining environmental compliance from countries that
are primary contributors to the effects of trade on the environment.
140
133 See id.
134 See Garvey, supra note 99, at 446.
131 Stenzel, supra note 29, at 472.
136 See generally Garvey, supra note 99.
137 See Porras, supra note 84, at 67.
138 See id. at 70.
139 See Spaulding, supra note 41, at 1138.
140 "The greatest environmental opportunity springing from the process of economic
integration in the Americas now lies in the chance to build up the CEC." Johnson, supra
note 22, at 275.
What the CEC provides to society should be acknowledged: an
accessible international forum to present and publicize environmental
problems. As flawed as the CEC may be, it is a significant step forward in
international trade agreements, which are only beginning to show their
promise. Moreover, the CEC is saturated with such potential that it
eventually will counterbalance the NAFTA. 14 1 Thus, one of the greatest
achievements the NAAEC may encounter, due to the CEC's acting as its
solid foundation, would be for future international trade agreements to
regard it as a mandated model.
PART IV: SUGGESTED ADAPTIONS TO THE NAFTA AND NAAEC
In light of the North American experience on environmental protection
and trade since 1994 and emerging environmental priorities, the following
suggests revisions to particular sections of the NAFTA and NAAEC.
Here, the objective consists of improving the NAFTA and NAAEC as
environmental enforcement tools and as public forums for trade and
environmental concerns, while maintaining their future political viability.
Although countless possible modifications exist, only conditions requiring
immediate attention are introduced here.
Although the NAFTA generally deters the waning of environmental
laws to promote investment and encourage the application of such
regulations, it fails to travel the extra step by enforcing strict adherence to
these ordinances. Since enforcement of environmental laws is of profound
importance, the NAFTA should only be condoned when it addresses these
concerns and compels international environmental cooperation. Hence, the
NAFTA should be revised, as the Independent Review Committee
suggests in its 1998 report, to include enforceable environmental
standards for those left out of the benefits of trade.
142
The NAAEC's submission process, on the other hand, should be
amended to enforce time constraints on the Secretariat. 143 There is no
viable reason not to impose such restrictions. Most importantly, this
would place greater significance on addressing environmental issues more
swiftly. Further, it should not be an indication that the Secretariat may
claim liberated discernment just because it has not, as of yet, taken
advantage of its position.
141 See id. at 129.
142 Article 10(1)(b) of the NAAEC requires the CEC's Council to review its operation and
effectiveness four years after its entry into force. See NAAEC, supra note 2, art. 10(1)(b).
In order to assist the Council in its review, the CEC Secretariat appointed an Independent
Review Committee ("IRC") to provide advice that suggests future directions for the
NAAEC. Id. The IRC's report was issued in June 1998.
143 See id. at 19. This suggestion does not coincide with the IRC's view on the submission
process: "the IRC sees no reason to suggest alterations to [the submission] part of the
process." Id.
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Under the NAAEC, if a submission indicates an inadequacy in
effectively exercising one's environmental laws, the Secretariat is allowed
to not demand a Party's response. This subservient reaction to the
disregarding of environmental laws goes against the grain of the NAAEC.
Thus, the NAAEC should be revised to mandate an answer to any
submission that addresses a possible disregard for environmental laws.
144
Finally, in lieu of the lessons of past international trade agreements,
many questions are leveled at whether domestic standards are efficient
international laws. These doubts arose after the Parties' local laws proved
to be inadequate in enforcing international environmental cooperation.
With this being the case, how could these nations assert rigorous
enforcement over the remainder of North America? 145 Obviously little, if
any, because one may assume that the Parties' environmental laws are
most likely inadequate 146 since they have proven to be ineffective in the
United States.
147
Finally, it is dire that new international standards be adopted in order
to maintain the linkage between environmental protection and trade.
Conclusionln light of the proliferation of international trade relations and
the often challenged disparity between trade and environmental regimes,
the NAAEC's implementation is a triumph for the environmental cause.
By propagating environmental protection against the adverse effects of
increased trade on the environment, the NAAEC suggests foresight into
environmental and international trade interests. In and of itself, the
integrating of the NAFTA and NAAEC connotes such "foresight" and a
positive attempt in the right direction. Now, such steps must continue
forward as environmental needs are already pressing. These efforts may
144 See id. Again, the IRC disagrees with the proposal in its report.
145 See Jonathan Schlefer, History Counsels "No" on NAFTA, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14,
1993, at 3(11) (suggesting that it is as nonsensical for Mexico, Canada, and the United
States to have different environmental rules as it would be if half of the United States
regulated air pollution and half did not).
146 But see Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, S. Doc. No. 103-360,
Cong., Sess., at 28 (Oct. 27, 1993) (U.S.T.R. Rufus H. Yerxa explaining that "the basic
assumption of this negotiation was that the laws themselves are quite good, the laws that
are on the books in all three countries are quite good, and the problem has been one of
enforcement...").
147 See, e.g., Al Gore, Earth in the Balance (1992); Bill Clinton & Al Gore, Putting
People First 93 (1992). At the federal level, for example, weak particulate air pollution
standards contribute to excess mortality in certain U.S. cities; Douglas W. Dockery et al.,
An Association Between Air Pollution and Mortality in Six U.S. Cities, 329 THE NEW
ENGLAND J. OF MEDICINE 1753, 1753 (1993); John H. Cushman Jr., States and
Government Lag in Meeting Clean Air Law, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1993, at A18. At the
state level, many serious problems also exist. For instance, the state of Arkansas has long
resisted imposing sanitary standards on poultry industry pollution; John T. Hollman, In
Arkansas Which Comes First, The Chicken or the Environment?. 6 TUL. ENVT'L L. J. 21,
27 (1992) (describing the magnitude of the manure problem in Arkansas as problematic).
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be consummated by mandating adherence to current environmental
standards while gradually incorporating more effective ones. A
challenging task stands before the NAAEC, and the results can only be
measured in due time.
CONCLUSION
In light of the proliferation of international trade relations and the
often challenged disparity between trade and environmental regimes, the
NAAEC's implementation is a triumph for the environmental cause. By
propagating environmental protection against the adverse effects of
increased trade on the environment, the NAAEC suggests foresight into
environmental and international trade interests. In and of itself, the
integrating of the NAFTA and NAAEC connotes such "foresight" and a
positive attempt in the right direction. Now, such steps must continue
forward as environmental needs are already pressing. These efforts may
be consummated by mandating adherence to current environmental
standards while gradually incorporating more effective ones. A
challenging task stands before the NAAEC, and the results can only be
measured in due time.
